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Abstract. Jazz band is a 3 player superadditive game in characteristic func-
tion form. Three players have to divide the payoff they can get, while being
in a grand coalition, provided their individual and duo coalitions payoffs are
known. Assumptions of individual and collective rationality lead to the notion
of the core of the game. We discuss offers that cannot readily be refused [OCRR]
as the solutions of the game in case of an empty core, when duo coalitions are
the best options but only for two out of three players. The experiment shows
that even in case of an empty core the most probable results are three-way
coalitions and the share of the weakest player usually exceeds his OCRR. The
Shapley value is introduced and its fairness is discussed as it lies at the side
of the core while, on the other hand, the nucleolus lies exactly at the center
of the core. We conclude that, in spite of that, the Shapley value is the best
candidate for a fair sharing solution of the jazz band game and other similar
games as, opposite to the other values, it is dependent both on individual and
duo coalitions payoffs.
Keywords: game theory; core of the game; Shapley value, nucleolus
1. Introduction
The cooperative game approach to fair division of goods is widely ac-
cepted to be the most promising way of deriving the problem. Different
fairness concepts have been developed so far. The best known one is the pro-
portionality law. If bank goes bankrupt, the customers who entrusted their
savings to that bank are paid in proportion to amounts they had saved
in the bank. This idea is well rooted in our culture because of Aristotle
(Young, 1994). For proportionality to be workable the good must be di-
visible and the extend of each player’s entitlement must be expressible in
a common metric. But even when both conditions are met, proportionality
may not be as compelling as it seems. Consider e.g. a situation where play-
ers do not have a single measure to draw their claims because their status
quo depends on the temporary coalition they can form.
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It was von Neumann and Morgenstern (Von Neumann & Morgenstern,
1944) who first considered the class of games in a characteristic function
form, where players could form coalitions and opportunities available to each
coalition could be described by a single number. This characteristic func-
tion model assumes that: the utilities are fully transferable among players,
the possibilities accessible to a coalition of players can be assessed without
reference to the players not included in the coalition and players are free to
make arbitrary coalitions in any way agreed by the members (Roth, 1988).
In recognition of the importance of the first assumption, these games are
sometimes called transferable utility games.
The best known concepts of cooperative solutions are the core, the
Shapley value and the nucleolus. In the present paper we discuss the notions
in context of well known jazz band game introduced by Peyton Young.
The example was described in (Malawski, Wieczorek, & Sosnowska, 1997)
without reference to the original source. (In my private communication with
Young he could not remember that source either.)
2. Jazz band game
Three artists: a singer, a pianist and a drummer play together in a night-
club in Montmartre. They earn 1000 FF (French francs) per night, provided
they perform together. But they often play in pairs or even individually in
that club. It is known that their earnings in pairs are: the singer and the
pianist – 800 FF, the pianist and the drummer – 650 FF and the singer and
the drummer – 500 FF. If they play individually the singer earns 200 FF
and the pianist 300 FF, whereas their colleague the drummer is not able to
earn anything individually. The payroll is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1
The players’ payroll in the jazz band game
Players: S P D (S,P) (S,D) (P,D) (S,P,D)
Earnings: 200 300 0 800 500 650 1000
A natural problem is the question how they should divide their earn-
ings in case of any joint performances. A naive answer could be that their
earnings when playing in duo should be proportional to single payoffs. This
would give the following division: 320 FF for the singer and 480 FF for the
pianist. However, this idea should be rejected since the drummer part in duo
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should then always be zero. Common sense leads us to the conclusion that
players should not accept any division that yields a share which is smaller
than the share they could get individually. This rule will be defined below
as individual rationality.
In case of the trio the proportional division is even more obscure –
how to weigh individual and duo payoffs in proportion? Here the common
sense rule, called the collective rationality, should ensure that the division
in trio should ensure that each two players will gain at least the amount
they are able to earn when playing in duo. Otherwise the players have no
incentive to search for the grand coalition (trio). This leads us to the notion
of a core of the problem. The core of the division problem is the set of
payoffs that obey the rules of individual and collective rationality. In other
words, a core division is such that gives every party, and every coalition of
parties, an incentive to participate.
3. The core of the game
To define the core precisely, let us define the set of all players by
N = {p1, p2, . . . , pn}, where n ∈ N is the total number of players. The coali-
tion of players is C ⊆ N i.e. an arbitrary subset of the set of all players.
The characteristic function is the function ν : 2N → R, which for any sub-
set C ⊆ N returns a number ν(C), which is the payoff of the coalition C,
i.e. the amount that the players in C could earn if they formed a coalition.
The payoff of the empty coalition is zero ν(∅) = 0. The game is called super-
additive provided ν(C ∪T ) ≥ ν(C)+ν(T ), where C, T ⊆ N are two disjoint
i.e. C ∩ T = ∅ coalitions.
In case of the jazz band game n = 3 and the coalitions are: ∅, {S},
{P}, {D}, {S,P}, {S,D}, {P,D}, {S,P,D}. The characteristic function is
defined by:
ν(∅) = 0
ν(S) = 200 ν(P ) = 300 ν(D) = 0
(1)
ν(S,P ) = 800 ν(S,D) = 500 ν(P,D) = 650
ν(S,P,D) = 1000
Note that the jazz band game is superadditive. The imputation is an n-
tuple (x1, x2, . . . , xn) which sums up to the payoff of the grand coali-
tion
∑n
i=1 xi = ν(N), which obeys the individual rationality condition
xi ≥ ν(pi).
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The core of the game is the set of all imputations, which obey collective
rationality i.e.
∑
pi∈C
xi ≥ ν(C) (2)
for any coalition C ⊆ N containing at least two players. The core is therefore
a set of all imputations that are acceptable for all possible coalitions. The
idea of collective rationality means that the imputation can be in the core
if the members of a given coalition C are getting the total payoff that is at
least as high as the payoff guaranteed by the characteristic function.
In case of the jazz band game the individual rationality means that
xS ≥ 200, xP ≥ 300 and xD ≥ 0. The core is the set of all imputations
that, apart from the individual rationality, obey the collective rationality,
that in this case means that xS+xP ≥ 800, xS+xD ≥ 500, xP +xD ≥ 650,
see Fig. 1.
Figure 1. The core of the jazz band game (shaded area) is the set of
imputations (xS , xP , xD), where xD = 1000− xP − xS , that obey
the conditions of individual and collective rationality
Note that the core of the game is a set of all imputations that give
every player and every coalition of players an incentive to participate in
the grand coalition. In other words, to any payoff, that can be obtained by
an individual player or a coalition of players there is the grand coalition
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that gives them the payoff which is greater or equal to that payoff. It is
not necessarily the case in general. There are possible cases where players
do not have an incentive to form the grand coalition – they are empty core
games.
4. Empty core game
The core of the game can be empty. Let us assume that the characteristic
function of some jazz band example is:
ν(∅) = 0
ν(S) = 200 ν(P ) = 300 ν(D) = 0
(2)
ν(S,P ) = 800 ν(S,D) = 500 ν(P,D) = 650
ν(S,P,D) = 950
i.e. the only difference is the grand coalition value ν(S,P,D) = 950. For
such a modified game the core is empty. Indeed substituting the imputation
condition xP + xS + xD = ν(S,P,D) = 950 to collective rationality con-
ditions yields that xP ≤ 450, xS ≤ 300 and xD ≤ 150, but such a triple
(xP , xS , xD) is not a imputation since xP + xS + xD < ν(S,P,D). Note
that such a modified game is still superadditive. Nevertheless, the players
do not find an incentive to form the grand coalition. One can see it, when
assuming that players agree to form one of the possible duo coalitions. The
collective rationality implies that their payoffs in duo coalitions are at least
xDS + x
D
P = 800, x
D
S + x
D
D = 500, x
D
P + x
D
D = 650. After solving the system
of the three equations with unknowns xDP , x
D
S , x
D
D, one gets:
xDS = 325
xDP = 475 (4)
xDD = 175
It means, that if a player chose the duo coalition, he could obtain at
least one of the above payoffs (see also Fig. 2.) But the sum of them is
xDS + x
D
P + x
D
D = 975 > ν(S,P,D) – greater than the amount accessible to
the grand coalition. Therefore in duo solutions the players can have higher
payoffs than the grand coalition but remember that one of the players must
be excluded from the band! It is important not to be omitted.
It is interesting to simulate the possible negotiation scheme, which leads
to a duo coalition and leaves one of them outside. Let us assume that we
negotiate as the Pianist. If e.g. P would like to get xP = 480 then his offer
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Figure 2. Offers that cannot be readily refused are the numbers in the corners
of the triangle. They add up to values of each duo coalitions (at the
sides of the triangle). In case of game with an empty core the sum of
OCRR is greater than the grand coalition payoff 950.
to S would be xS = 320, then S can build coalition with D, sharing their
duo payoff xS = 325, xD = 175, which is better than the proposal from P .
Note that D’s payoff is also better than xD = 170 that he could get if
P insisted on xP = 480. However, if P ’s offer to S would be xS = 325,
or to D xD = 175 (while xP = 475) neitherS nor D can refuse it, because
their duo payoff is exactly ν(S,D) = 500 = 325+175. The set of solutions (4)
are called offers that cannot readily be refused [OCRR] (Raiffa, Richardson,
& Metcalfe, Negotiation Analysis. The Science and Art of Collaborative
Decision Making, 2007, p. 438).
The bargaining is in this case very unstable. By this we mean that there
are no rational reasons to form one or another duo coalition. The threat
that one of the players can be left outside the coalition may prevail the
bargaining procedure resulting in acceptance of the grand coalition, which
is less favourable but more secure for players. In the next section we attempt
to find a fair share in case of the grand coalition.
5. The Shapley value
In this section we return to the original problem (1) of a nonempty core.
We will try to compare different shares of the grand coalition payoff, which
is in this case the most beneficial for the players.
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The first idea is the use of proportionality to OCRR. The concept
of OCRR is independent of the size of the core and can be used to find
a fair share. As we have noticed in the previous section, the sum of jazz
band OCRR’s (4) is 975 and it is smaller than the grand coalition payoff
which is 1000. The proportional rescaling of the shares (3) yields
xPS ≃ 333.3
xPP ≃ 487.2 (5)
xPD ≃ 179.5
The share proportional to OCRR has a disadvantage – it is not dependent
on the individual payoffs of the players ν(pi). Therefore it is easy to find
conditions under which this solution is outside the core. It is enough to take
ν(P ) = 490 in (1) to obtain a nonempty core, which does not contain the
share proportional to OCRR.
The Shapley value was first formulated in (Shapley, 1953). It is based
on three axioms that are believed to reflect the symmetry of the problem
well. Shapley proved that there is one and only one function SV , which to
any game (N, ν) assigns an imputation x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) and obeys the
axioms:
Axiom 1. The imputation SV = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) depends only on the
characteristic function v and reflects its symmetries, e.g. if players i and j
have symmetric roles then xj = xj .
Axiom 2. If ν(C) = ν(C \ {xi}) for all coalitions C ⊆ N , then xi = 0.
The value of the null player is zero.
Axiom 3. SV (ν+µ) = SV (ν)+SV (µ), where SV (ν+µ) is the Shapley
value of the sum game, defined for the same set of players N , whose payoffs
are (ν + µ)(C) = (ν)(C) + (µ)(C) for any coalition C ⊆ N .
The Shapley method is effective i.e. apart from the proof of existence it
also gives an effective formula for calculating SV . The formula can be easily
presented in the jazz band example, see Table 1.
In the rows of the table are defined different orders in which the grand
coalition can be formed. The values added by the players in a given row of
the Table 1 are calculated as follows (the row P,D, S is explained):
P : ν(P )− ν(∅) = 300− 0 = 300
D : ν(P,D)− ν(P ) = 650 − 300 = 350 (6)
S : ν(S,P,D)− ν(P,D) = 1000 − 650 = 350
In the last row of the table the average of each column is calculated,
which is the Shapley value corresponding to each player. One can think
about the Shapley value that it is the average value that each player adds
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Table 1
The calculation of the Shapley Value for the jazz band game (1)
Value added by
Ordering Total
S P D
S, P, D 200 600 200 1000
S, D, P 200 500 300 1000
P, S, D 500 300 200 1000
P, D, S 350 300 350 1000
D, S, P 500 500 0 1000
D, P, S 350 650 0 1000
Average: 350 475 175 1000
while the grand coalition is formed, the average is taken over all the possible
orders in which the players can enter that coalition. Note that Shapley value
reflects the payoffs (1) of single, duo and trio bands. The values of the share
proportional to OCRR and Shapley value are shown in Fig. 3.
Figure 3. The core of the jazz band game (1) with different shares for the
grand coalition
It may be surprising that the share proportional to OCRR lies closer
to the center of the core than the Shapley value, which in this case lies at
its border. Indeed the share proportional to OCRR is closer to the center
of the core because, in this case, it is defined by the collective rationality
conditions. The Shapley value therefore may not be satisfactory for the
coalition (P,D) whose total Shapley value 475 + 175 = 650 is the same as
in case of their duo coalition ν(P,D) = 650.
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The Shapley value has also other drawbacks as well – it may yield
inconsistent answers. If e.g. two players have payoffs of 200 and 300 and
their coalition value is 300 then the Shapley value is 100 for the first player
and 200 for the second ond one. If we duplicate the problem i.e. there are
four players, two receive payoffs of 200 and two – payoffs of 300 and the
grand coalition payoff is 600, then we would expect the Shapley value to
be duplicated: it should be 100 for the first two players and 200 for the
other two players. But Shapley value allocates 11623 – to each of the first
two players and 18213 – for each of the remaining two players (Young, 1994).
Such a solution is inconsistent with the case of two players. Note that the
Axiom 3 does not prevent such a drawback because it concerns only games
with the same number of players.
6. The nucleolus
In the previous section we have defined two “solutions” to the jazz band
game, the imputation proportional to OCRR and the Shapley value. Both
of them have drawbacks and may not be regarded as a fair share in case
of that game. In the present section we are going to define one more value,
nucleolus – introduced by (Schmeidler, 1969).
Let us recall that the core of the game consists of imputations that
satisfy
∑
pi∈C
xi ≥ ν(C) for any coalition C ⊆ N . In case of the jazz band
game the core is not empty, and our goal is to find one imputation x =
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) that is fair and in particular – is located as close as possible
to its center (because of the collective rationality condition). The way to
obtain such a value is to maximize the distance of the imputation from the
sides of the core. The measure of its distance is the value
dC(x) =
∑
pi∈C
xi − ν(C) (7)
for C ⊆ N corresponding to different coalitions defining lines forming the
core. Some of these lines form sides of the core and some of them lie outside
the core. Our goal is to find the imputation x, which will maximize the
minimal of the distances dC(x). In other words, we are looking for the
imputation that is as far as possible from the sides of the core – therefore
maximizing the minimal amount that players earn in addition to the amount
they can have without forming the great coalition. In some cases there are
several different imputations that maximize the minimal distance. Then
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one should maximize the second minimal, then the third minimal, and so
on until one gets the unique imputation.
Let us start from the Shapley value and calculate the distances
dS(x) = xS − ν(S) = 350− 200 = 150
dP (x) = xP − ν(P ) = 475− 300 = 175
dD(x) = xD − ν(D) = 175 − 0 = 175 (8)
dS,P (x) = xS + xP − ν(S,P ) = 350 + 475 − 800 = 25
dS,D(x) = xS + xD − ν(S,D) = 350 + 175− 500 = 25
dP,D(x) = xP + xD − ν(P,D) = 475 + 175 − 650 = 0
The distance corresponding to the grand coalition is zero by definition∑n
i=1 xi = ν(N). As one can notice, the minimal of the distances is
dP,D(x) = 0 (because the Shapley value lies at the side of the core). To
maximize the minimal distance we may increase values of xP and xD but
we have to remember that xS = 1000−xP −xD. Therefore we have to make
sure to do it only to such an extent, where dS,P (x) and dS,D(x) are not
decreased too much. The solution is easy to find assuming equal minimal
distances
dS,P (x) = dS,D(x) = dP,D(x) = 16
2
3 (9)
And the corresponding imputation – the nucleolus of the problem is
xNS = 333
1
3
xNP = 483
1
3 (10)
xND = 183
1
3
In Figure 3 we can see that nucleolus is the central point of the core – it
is so by definition – the nucleolus have the same distances from three sides
of the triangle forming the core. Therefore it can be regarded as the share
that is most equitable among others. It has also the amiable feature that it
is always in the core, provided it is not empty.
The nucleolus has another interesting characteristic feature – it can
be defined even in case of an empty core. In this case some of distance
formulas (8) give negative numbers. But the procedure of finding nucleolus is
the same. It is the point x that maximizes the minimal of the distances dC(x)
for all C ⊂ N . In case of the empty core game (3) the nucleolus is basically
the same as in eq. (10), where each value is reduced by the same amount
162
3
= 50
3
, which comes from the condition
∑n
i=1 xi = ν(N) = 950.
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7. Jazz band negotiations
In this section we will apply the obtained results to actual negotia-
tions between the three artists. We are especially interested in preparation
and in bargaining phase of negotiations. Firstly, let us notice, that the ne-
gotiation process will be qualitatively different depending on the core of
the game. If the core is empty, the players may not find an incentive to
form the grand coalition and one can expect that they agree to form one of
the possible duo coalitions, leaving the third partner outside. The crucial
point in negotiation would be to prevent being left outside the coalition.
For a nonempty core, there is no point in leaving one of the players outside.
The third coalition partner always brings enough value – the grand coali-
tion payoff can be divided by imputations that obey any two-way collective
rationality conditions.
Let us first assume the case of an empty core ν(S,P,D) = 950. As we
remember, in such case the players have OCRR values (4), which are fair
shares in any duo coalition. Each player wants to approach one of the others
to encourage him to form a coalition. Because the share of D is the smallest,
he is most susceptible to incentives.
Let S approach D confidentially and offer him xD = 180 – five FF more
than he can expect from any duo OCRR coalition. Assume that S and D
agree to form a coalition and act together against P . Then they can ap-
proach P to offer him a trio coalition but on their conditions. The value
that P is adding to S and D duo is 450 and his individual rationality
level is xP = 300. So S and D coalition can offer P half of the added
value i.e. xP = 375, while keeping xS + xD = 575, which can be divided
e.g. xS = 360 and xP = 215. But because the core is empty any such trio
coalitions can be outbid by a duo. For example P can invite D to a duo
coalition xP = 400 and xD = 250 which would leave S outside. Then S can
be invited to a three-way coalition by P and D under their conditions,
and so on... On each level of such bargaining one or two of the players
are left with the share which is less than their OCRR and one (or two) of
them usually get more than OCRR. The player that is most likely to get
a share exceeding his OCRR is the weakest player to whom such an offer is
the most tempting. Therefore he can choose which competitor he wishes to
form a coalition with. But his claims must be moderate as the other players
can always build a coalition leaving him without any payoff. On the other
hand the strongest player is most likely to be the one, who gets less than
his OCRR value. Being potentially the strongest partner, he is most likely
to be punished by his weaker partners. Therefore in the empty core case
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there is a natural tendency that the negotiation results change from OCRR
towards egalitarian solutions.
The coalition game with an empty core was played in a series of experi-
ments performed by the author with trainees attending negotiation courses.
In these experiments three parties, not familiar with game theory, were given
the scenario of the singer, the player and the drummer. The time was lim-
ited to 20 minutes for preparation and to 40 minutes for negotiations. The
parties were asked to prepare for negotiations and propose their individual
“fair share”. After that, they started face to face negotiations in triples and
pairs – they were encouraged to meet occasionally in pairs without the pres-
ence of the third party. The results confirm the above considerations. More
than 80% of negotiations resulted in a grand coalition agreement. The aver-
age results of the three-way coalitions are shown in Table 2 in comparison
with the Shapley value and the nucleolus. Note that OCRRs, which are also
shown in the table, sum up to 975.
In about 90% of negotiations that ended in three-way coalitions, the
players got involved in some duo coalitions at some time during the negoti-
ations. In the 20% that did not result with a grand coalition, about half of
them did not form any coalition at all and the other half formed some duo
coalitions.
Table 2
The comparison of OCRR and experimental results with the Shapley value
and nucleolus for the jazz band game with an empty core
S P D xP + xS + xD
OCRR 325 475 175 975
Experiment 310 425 215 950
Shapley value 333,3 458,3 158,3 950
Nucleolus 316,7 466,7 166,7 950
Two artists who form a two-way coalition (e.g. the singer and the pi-
anist) could ask the nightclub owner to increase the payoff of the grand
coalition from 950 FF to 1000 FF. This relatively small increase changes
the solutions of the game in a way that there is an incentive for every-
body to form a grand coalition which is preferable also for the owner of
the club. In case of a nonempty core there is no threat of being left outside
the grand coalition and the players are much more likely to agree to Shap-
ley value or nucleolus. Therefore while the singer and pianist may wish for
the trio payoff to be increased, the drummer may not be interested in such
a change.
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8. Conclusions
To summarize, we have proposed three different ways to calculate the
solution of the jazz band game assuming that players create a grand coali-
tion: share proportional to OCRR, Shapley value and nucleolus. In the game
with a nonempty core the first and the third are located close to the center
of the core. The Shapley value lies exactly at the side of the core and is far
from its center.
In case of the game with an empty core the most profitable solutions
are obtained by two-way coalitions. The threat to one of the players to be
left out of a two-way coalition introduces coalitional instabilities – which
duo coalition is to be formed? The most likely partner in two-way coalitions
is the weakest partner. As a result of that the weakest partner gains more
than his OCRR value and the coalition is extended to a three-way but this
happens at the expense of one of the other partners. We have confirmed
this result in a series of negotiations conducted by experiment participants.
The weakest player may not have an incentive to increase the three-way
coalition payoff to the level of a nonempty core.
In case of a nonempty core the Shapley value is located at the side of the
core – far from its center. Note, however, that only the Shapley value takes
into account both individual and duo coalition payoffs. In case of the share
proportional to OCRR the individual payoffs are neglected. The same is
true in the case of nucleolus – conditions connected with individual payoffs
(three first equations in (8)) do not influence its position. That is the reason
why, in our opinion, the Shapley value, although it may not be in the center
of the core, is still a very good answer to ensure a fair solution of the three
players problem.
It could be interesting to modify the nucleolus by redefining the mini-
mal distances (collective rationality) in a way dependent on the individual
rationality conditions.
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